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Tobias Egner *
Department of Psychology and Neuroscience, Center for Cognitive Neuroscience, Duke University, Durham, NC, USA
Decision makers frequently encounter opportunities to pursue great gains—assuming
they are willing to accept greater risks. Previous neuroimaging studies have shown that
activity in the intraparietal sulcus (IPS) and the inferior frontal junction (IFJ) are associated
with individual preferences for economic risk (“known unknowns,” e.g., a 50% chance of
winning $5) and ambiguity (“unknown unknowns,” e.g., an unknown chance of winning
$5), respectively. Whether processing in these regions causally enables risk-taking for
individual decisions, however, remains unknown. To examine this question, we assessed
the decision to engage in risk-taking after disrupting neural processing in the IPS and IFJ
of healthy human participants using repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation. While
stimulation of the IFJ resulted in general slowing of decision times, disrupting neural
processing within the IPS selectively suppressed risk-taking, biasing choices toward
certain options featuring both lower risks and lower expected rewards. Our results are
the first to demonstrate the necessity of intact IPS function for choosing uncertain
outcomes when faced with calculable risks and rewards. Engagement of IPS during
decision making may support a willingness to accept uncertain outcomes for a chance
to obtain greater gains.
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INTRODUCTION
Decision making is often characterized by the need to make difficult tradeoffs between uncertain
risks and rewards. Although excessive risk-seeking can be problematic (Yates, 1992), investors and
economists have also recognized that obtaining greater rewards often requires accepting greater
risk (Markowitz, 1952). An abundance of caution can sometimes endanger long-term financial
goals such as retirement and homeownership (Bajtelsmit and VanDerhei, 1997), or lead to missed
opportunities, such as when a promising job offer is turned down because it requires relocating
to an unfamiliar city. Decision makers thus stand to benefit from control mechanisms capable of
calibrating risk-taking behavior based on existing risk preferences as well as situational risks and
benefits.
In the current investigation, we examine the contributions of two brain regions key to such
flexible behavioral control during uncertain decisions: the intraparietal sulcus (IPS) and the inferior
frontal junction (IFJ). Traditional (Mohr et al., 2010) and large-scale automated (Yarkoni et al.,
2011) metanalyses of neuroimaging studies demonstrate consistent activation within the IPS and
IFJ during uncertain decision making. Activation within these two regions has been found to scale
with the degree of uncertainty as information is accumulated toward a decision (Huettel et al., 2005)
Abbreviations: IPS, Intraparietal sulcus; IFJ, inferior frontal junction; rTMS, repetitive Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation.
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and reflects outcome uncertainty in a manner dissociable from
other choice-related processes (Bach et al., 2009). Information
represented within the IFJ and IPS prior to an uncertain decision
is also predictive of subsequent decisions to engage in risk-taking
(Helfinstein et al., 2014).
The IPS and IFJ show evidence of differential sensitivity to
two important forms of uncertainty: economic risk (“known
unknowns,” e.g., a 50% chance of winning $5) and ambiguity
(“unknown unknowns,” i.e., an unknown chance of winning $5;
Knight, 1921; Ellsberg, 1961; Camerer and Weber, 1992). IPS
activation is enhanced for risky choices relative to intertemporal
choices (Weber and Huettel, 2008), with this activation
preferentially tracking risky subjective value (Peters and Büchel,
2009). Similarly, neuronal activity measured in the non-human
primate analog of IPS represents the relative subjective value
of risky choices (Dorris and Glimcher, 2004). The IFJ, by
contrast, is robustly active during ambiguous decision making
(Huettel et al., 2006) and in response to ambiguous aversive cues
(Bach et al., 2009), with individual differences in responses to
ambiguity predicting behavioral ambiguity aversion (Bach et al.,
2011). In an fMRI study directly comparing neural processing of
risk and ambiguity, Huettel and colleagues identified a double-
dissociation, with greater IPS activation predicting an increased
acceptance of risk, and greater IFJ activation predicting an
increased acceptance of ambiguity (Huettel et al., 2006). Such
results thus strongly implicate the IPS and IFJ in uncertain
decisionmaking, and suggest that these regionsmay differentially
represent uncertainty preferences during risky and ambiguous
choices. Whether intact processing in these regions is actually
required to engage in risk-taking, however, remains unknown.
To address this question, we conducted an experiment in
which participants engaged in risk-taking for monetary rewards
while we manipulated both the type of uncertainty they faced—
and critically—the integrity of neural processing within the IPS
and IFJ. We applied MRI-guided 1-Hz repetitive transcranial
magnetic stimulation (rTMS)—thought to inhibit (Chen et al.,
1997) or disrupt (Harris et al., 2008) neural processing—over
the IPS, IFJ, and a vertex control site in a counterbalanced
within-subjects design (Figure 1A). After each rTMS treatment,
we examined participants’ risk-taking behavior (choices and
response times) across a series of decision trials. Each decision
pitted a certain but small reward against an uncertain reward
(Figure 1B), with uncertainty being either “risky” (a known
25, 50, or 75% chance of reward) or “ambiguous” (unknown
chance of reward). The expected value of the uncertain option
was varied to offer a premium over the value of the certain
option in a majority of trials, thereby incentivizing risk-taking
to various degrees. Based on the previous findings discussed
above, we made two independent predictions: First, relative
to control rTMS, IPS rTMS would interfere with uncertain
decision-making for risky decision trials; second, IFJ rTMS
would likewise disrupt decision processes for ambiguous trials.
We analyzed the effects of rTMS location on choices and
response times for these decisions using a multilevel mixed-
models approach for repeated measures, treating both decisions
and participants as random (as opposed to fixed) effects. Our
design thus allowed us to draw causal inferences regarding the
FIGURE 1 | rTMS targets and task design. (A) rTMS was applied to three
targets: the left IPS (−36, −57, 50), right IFJ (39, 16, 33), and between the
cerebral hemispheres at vertex (0, −28, 90) as an active control. Targets were
based on group level fMRI contrasts from our previous investigation of risk and
ambiguity preferences (Huettel et al., 2006), and were located within each
participant using their structural MRI scan from an earlier study. (B)
Participants chose between a certain option (known outcome, left circles) and
either a risky option (top right) or an ambiguous option (bottom right).
importance of IPS and IFJ to decision making under both risk
and ambiguity.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
Fifteen right-handed adult participants (mean age 27.43,
range 19–43; six female) reported no history of psychiatric
or neurological disorders and passed MRI and TMS safety
screenings (Rossi et al., 2009). Written informed consent was
obtained from each participant prior to each study session.
Participants received $80, plus additional payments based on task
decisions. Procedures were reviewed and approved by the Duke
University institutional review board.
Procedure Overview
Participants completed separate 1-h MRI and 3-h rTMS visits.
Anatomical MRI images were used for personalized neuro-
navigated targeting during the rTMS study. Prior to receiving
rTMS, participants were screened, familiarized with the study
equipment, and trained on the decision-making task. Participants
then completed a full (165 trials, paid) practice run of the task.
We conducted a within-subjects experiment in which each
participant received two rTMS treatments: one to the right
IFJ and one to the left IPS, with site coordinates based on
a prior neuroimaging study employing an equivalent decision
task (Huettel et al., 2006). Participants also received an active-
control session of rTMS to the interhemispheric fissure at vertex,
for a total of three rTMS sessions per participant (order of
TMS stimulation sites was counter-balanced over participants
to control for any order effects). Sessions applied 15 min of
1-Hz rTMS, a protocol shown to disrupt (Harris et al., 2008)
or inhibit (Chen et al., 1997) neural information processing for
approximately 10 min (Robertson et al., 2003; Eisenegger et al.,
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2008). Immediately following rTMS, participants completed a
run (165 trials) of the decision-making task. There was a resting
period of about 10 min after each run to minimize carryover
effects, resulting in a total washout period of approximately 30
min prior to each run of the decision task (5m previous task run
+ 10m rest+ 15m current rTMS session).
Upon completion of the experiment, participants were
debriefed and questioned about headaches, discomfort, or any
other acute side effects (over-the-counter pain medication was
available, but all subjects declined). Prior to release, participants
were required to pass an evaluation of basic perceptual, short
term, and working memory function, awareness of current time
and location. Participants were contacted 24 h after the study to
check for any experimental side effects (none were reported).
Decision-Making Task
Participants made self-paced choices between certain (e.g., 100%
chance of $5) and uncertain options. Uncertain options were
either risky (e.g., 50% chance of $12) or ambiguous (e.g.,
“??”% chance of $12). Stimuli and task design were adapted
from prior studies of risky/ambiguous choices (Huettel et al.,
2006; Stanton et al., 2011). Briefly, gambles were presented
side-by-side on a gray background, with position of the risky
gamble randomized. Gambles were represented as pie charts
(Figure 1B), with the probability of winning money indicated
by the blue-shaded pie area, and the complementary probability
of winning nothing represented by the remaining area shaded
yellow. Certain gambles were thus entirely blue. Ambiguous
gambles, by contrast, had their shading hidden beneath a white
field featuring a black questionmark. Dollar magnitudes available
to win were superimposed over each shaded area in white, or,
for ambiguous gambles, set outside the hidden circle marker in
black. For each trial, a fixation dot (150 ms) was followed by the
options. Self-paced choices were indicated using the right hand to
press the left or right arrow keys, although if longer than 5000ms
or less than 200ms, a brief message encouraged faster or slower
responses, respectively. A box indicated the chosen gamble for
250ms. Participants did not observe the outcomes of any gambles
or receive any gamble bonus winnings until after the completion
of all four task runs. Participants were instructed that the winning
probability for ambiguous options was hidden, but could take any
value from 0 to 100%.
We manipulated the certain option reward amount ($3–$7),
uncertain option reward amount ($2–$98) and the degree of
option uncertainty (75%, 50%, 25%, or ??%) to incentivize the
uncertain option to various degrees. We combined values on
these variables to construct 165 distinct gamble scenarios (45
each for 25%, 50%, and 75% risk; 30 for ambiguity). This set
of 165 gambles was repeated for each task run with gamble
order randomized, allowing repeated measures comparisons
controlling for subject, gamble, and subject-by-gamble effects.
The majority of these gambles (128 out of 165) were constructed
such that the uncertain option had a higher expected value than
the certain option, thereby providing an incentive to choose the
uncertain option (17 had equal expected value, and 20 had greater
certain expected value). We based the level of these incentives
on previous observations of risk and ambiguity aversion in this
task, such that stronger incentives tended to be provided for
conditions characterized by higher risk/ambiguity aversion. The
ratio of the uncertain vs. the certain expected value (assuming
ambiguous options to have an expected probability of 0.5) thus
ranged from 0.5 to 3.6. The higher end of this range was
covered by the ambiguous and 25% gambles to sufficiently reward
risk taking, as participants are typically strongly risk-averse to
such gambles. By contrast, the 75% gambles covered the lower
end of this range, with 50% gambles intermediate to these
extremes.
To provide participants an incentive to choose according to
their preferences, we explained that for each run of the task (165
gamble trials) we would randomly select one trial, and that at the
end of the experiment, we would resolve the gambles from those
trials according to their choice, and pay them the winnings from
each trial. Participants completed four runs of the task (initial
practice run and three runs following rTMS sessions) and were
thus paid for a total of four such bonus trials. The average bonus
compensation was $38.43 per participant (with a range of $8 to
$125).
Anatomical MRI Scan Acquisition
Anatomical imaging was conducted on a 3.0 Tesla GE Discovery
MR750 system using an eight-channel head coil, conducting a
T1-weighted FSPGR scan in the axial plane with a 3D inversion
recovery prepared sequence (120 slices, 1 mm slice thickness, 1×
1mm in-plane resolution).
Repetitive Transcranial Magnetic
Stimulation (rTMS)
We employed an “off-line” 1-Hz rTMS protocol with the
goal of disrupting information processing within the targeted
brain regions prior to a series of economic decisions involving
uncertainty. This paradigm has been previously shown to inhibit
primarymotor cortex, reduce signal strength in visual processing,
and perturb social and economic decision making (Knoch et al.,
2006; Camus et al., 2009; Figner et al., 2010; Baumgartner
et al., 2011). Research participants were unaware of both the
study hypotheses and the presence of a placebo target condition
(vertex stimulation). The experiment thus reflected a single-
blind placebo-controlled design. Each participant received three
15-min, 900-pulse trains of 1-Hz rTMS, with each applied over
a separate brain region at an intensity of 100% of resting
motor threshold using a Magstim Rapid2 stimulator with a
Magstim Double 70mm Air Film Coil (The Magstim Company
Limited, Whitland, Dyfed, UK). Sessions were separated by
∼15min (5min for decision task and 10 min of break/setup
time). Motor threshold was determined for each participant
using electromyographic recording of the dorsal interosseus
muscle of the right hand. Following standard procedures
(Rossi et al., 2009), motor threshold was defined as the
lowest percentage of maximum stimulator output required
to evoke at least 5 out of 10 motor-evoked potentials with
peak-to-peak amplitude of at least 50µV. Stimulation was
conducted with the coil positioned tangential to the skull,
perpendicular to underlying gyral/sulcal brain anatomy, and
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with the coil head more anterior and coil handle more
posterior.
Neuronavigated rTMS Targeting
rTMS was applied to three anatomical locations. Standardized
MNI coordinates for the IPS (−36, −57, 50) and IFJ (39, 16,
33) were based on peak group activations associated with risk
and ambiguity preferences in a previous fMRI study (Huettel
et al., 2006). MNI coordinates for the vertex active control site
(0, −28, 90) were determined by selecting the coordinates falling
most directly over the interhemispheric fissure at the peak of the
standardized MNI brain.
Coordinates were identified for each participant using
their structural MRI scan and a neuro-navigated rTMS
procedure implemented using the Brainsight suite of tools and
software (Rogue Research, Montreal, Canada). Each participant’s
anatomical MRI image was mapped to MNI standard space
based on manual registration landmarks (anterior commissure,
posterior commissure, brain size, and edges), allowing rTMS
targets defined in MNI coordinates to be translated to each
individual’s native brain anatomy. Next, we co-registered our
participants’ cranial features with their anatomical MRI scans,
using the left and right intertragal notch, nasion, and tip
of nose. This allowed us to target the IPS, IFJ, and vertex
consistently within individual participants. Participants were re-
registered prior to each rTMS administration to insure accurate
administration.
Dependent and Independent Measures
The dependent variables of primary interest were choice
(selection of the certain or uncertain option) and decision
time (ms). We used multilevel logistic regression with a
logit link function and binary distribution to analyze choices,
and multilevel generalized linear regression with a lognormal
distribution and an identity link function to analyze decision
times. We also estimated the theoretical impact of rTMS
stimulation on the average expected return from participants’
choices (i.e., the expected consequences if they had been paid
for each trial) by modeling rTMS effects on the expected
value of the chosen option for each trial. This approach was
selected because its repeated-measures nature paralleled our
analysis of choices and RT’s, and because our small number
of compensated trials (1 per run) precluded any meaningful
analysis of rTMS consequences on participant’s real take-home
bonus pay. Estimates were interpreted as ratios of odds, or
converted to relative risk, using the formula Relative Risk=Odds
Ratio / (1−Pc) + (Pc × Odds Ratio) where Pc is the probability
of occurrence in the control condition (Zhang and Yu, 1998).
Independent variables of primary interest included the rTMS
treatment condition (vertex, IFJ, or IPS), the difference of
uncertain and certain option reward magnitudes (continuous),
the uncertain option probability (25, 50, 75%, or ambiguous),
and the interactions of these variables. Variables included in our
models but not of primary interest were a categorical variable
reflecting the rTMS condition order (controlling for any order
effects) and variables included to control for any time period
effects. For the choice model, we included a categorical fixed-
effects time variable reflecting the task run number, while in the
decision time model, we included both fixed, and random-effects
for a continuous variable reflecting the total number of trials
already completed (i.e., controlling for practice effects). These
control variables helped account for time effects including a clear
practice effects for response times as well as a slight increase in
risky choices by the end of the study.
Study personnel responsible for data analysis and modeling
were blinded to the rTMS treatment conditions during the
primary stages of data analysis, as rTMS conditions were coded
as an arbitrary single-digit number. This coding was maintained
until after omnibus tests demonstrated significant interaction
of (coded) rTMS treatment with uncertainty type. The code
blinding was lifted only when it became necessary to test
previously hypothesized contrasts between the experimental and
control conditions.
Repeated Measures and Multilevel
Modeling
We implemented multilevel mixed-effects models for repeated
measures (Snijders, 2011) to account for non-independence
due to our design (165 gambles repeated across three rTMS
treatments) and subject effects (individual differences in
risk/ambiguity aversion and average decision speed). The
165 gamble scenarios were modeled as “subject level”
observations (three observations each), while participants
were modeled as “group level” observations. We thus controlled
for sources of dependency by simultaneously accounting
for variance at the trial and participant levels, allowing for
valid inferences regarding expected rTMS effects in the
broader population. High intraclass correlations (indicating
a violation of the independence assumption) for each of
our independent variables confirmed that a mixed model
approach was justified. This approach also allowed us to address
trial-varying effects (i.e., practice effects on decision speed,
which evolve through time) and participant-varying effects
(e.g., broader preference or personality trait influences on
decisions).
We fit models using SAS 9.3 Proc GLIMMIX (Sas Institute,
2011). Models were estimated using residual pseudo-likelihood
estimation with subject-specific Taylor series expansion (Breslow
and Clayton, 1993). The residual degrees of freedom were
determined using the improved F approximation procedure
described by Kenward and Roger (2009). To avoid unnecessary
statistical comparisons between conditions, we restricted
pairwise comparison in two ways. First, we examined only
rTMS treatment effects, always matching other model factors
across comparisons (i.e., comparing choices on the 50% trials
between control, IFJ, and IPS rTMS, but never comparing
50% trials directly to 25% trials). Second, we conducted
such comparisons only when the omnibus test for the effect
(Type III sum of squares F-test) was significant at the 5%
level.
An advantage of a multilevel models approach to repeated
measures is that missing-at-random observations are
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permissible. Data was missing for three rTMS sessions in
our study: one participant declined to complete the IFJ rTMS
condition, while neuro-navigated targeting failed for two rTMS
sessions (one IFJ, one vertex).
RESULTS
We examined the effects of rTMS on decision making by
recording choice and response time on each gamble trial.
Descriptive statistics are shown in Table 1, while inferential
tests and degrees of freedom are reported below as Kenward-
Rogers approximations, thereby incorporating a conservative
adjustment appropriate for mixed, unbalanced designs in
the behavioral sciences (Kenward and Roger, 2009). We
hypothesized that, compared to control rTMS, perturbation
of processing within IPS would reduce risk-taking for risky
choices, while disruption of IFJ processing would similarly
affect ambiguous choices (cf. Huettel et al., 2006; Bach et al.,
2011). Results confirmed our hypothesis for IPS stimulation,
which biased choices toward the certain options within the 50%
probability condition [F(6, 6905) = 2.42, P= 0.02; Figure 2A]. For
50% trials—which involvemaximal uncertainty—IPS stimulation
increased the probability of choosing the certain option by
30% [95% CI [12%, 48%], t(6905) = 3.26, P = 0.0011]. This
increase in certain choices for IPS stimulation was also significant
when compared to the effects of IFJ stimulation on 50% trials
[t(6905) = 2.62, P = 0.0089]. The specificity of this effect to
the 50% probability trials is consistent with previous decision
making results showing maximal rTMS effects at intermediate
choice probabilities (Figner et al., 2010). IFJ stimulation, by
contrast, produced no reliable effect on choices (all Ps 0.09–0.56,
Supplemental Results: Choices).
Since the risky option was incentivized for most of our
gambles, more conservative decision making would be expected
to reduce uncertainty, but also to reduce expected earnings. To
quantify the impact of IPS stimulation on expected earnings (i.e.,
average theoretical earnings if all gamble decisions were resolved)
we analyzed a model in which the dependent variable was the
expected value of the chosen option (with ambiguous probability
modeled as 0.50). We examined the difference in expected value
for the chosen option on 50% probability trials, comparing
gambles after IPS stimulation to matched gambles after vertex
control stimulation. The results of this comparison revealed that
the 30% increase in certain choices induced by IPS stimulation
corresponded to a 5% decrease in average expected value relative
to control rTMS [-$0.34 per trial/-$15.30 per subject, t(4119) =
−4.1, p = 0.0001, Supplemental Results: Expected Value]. IPS
stimulation thus affected choices such that both risk-taking and
expected rewards were reduced for 50% probability trials.
To gain further insight into the observed decrease in risk-
taking following IPS stimulation, we examined response time
(RT), which is often better suited to revealing subtle influences
of rTMS on the efficiency of information processing (Luber
and Lisanby, 2014). The effects of rTMS location on RT for
the 25, 50, and 75% probabilities were similar in magnitude
and direction [interaction F(4, 5637) = 0.6, P = 0.66], so we
collapsed these trials into a single “risky decision” category. Our
subsequent analysis showed a main effect of rTMS location on
RT [F(2, 4676) = 7.18, P= 0.0008], which was qualified by a three-
way interaction of rTMS location, trial type (risky or ambiguous),
and chosen option [certain or uncertain; F(2, 6895) = 3.81, P =
0.02]. IPS stimulation did not affect RTs for ambiguous trials,
but did so on risky trials, for which the effect was moderated
by the chosen outcome [t(6892) = 4.01, P = 0.0001; Figure 2B].
Specifically, IPS stimulation slowed choices of the uncertain
option [1 RT = 52 ms, +5.64%, 95% CI [2.11%, 9.29%], t(5116)
= 3.16, P = 0.002], but trended toward facilitating or speeding
up choices of the certain option [1 RT = −27ms, −2.88%,
95% CI [−5.76%, 0.09%], t(4421) = −1.9, P = 0.057]. No other
contrasts showed evidence of decision speeds faster than their
corresponding vertex control (Supplemental Results: Response
Times). By comparison, IFJ stimulation resulted in a general
disruption of decision processing slowing choices across all trial
types [1 RT = 52ms, +5.59%, 95% CI [2.61%, 8.66%], t(5148) =
3.73, P = 0.0002; Figure 2B].
DISCUSSION
Effective decision makers are adept at weighing the potential
benefits of an opportunity against the uncertainty surrounding
their realization. Here, we examined the contributions of the left
IPS and right IFJ to such decisionmaking bymanipulating neural
activity within these regions using 1-Hz rTMS. IPS stimulation
reduced risk-taking on risky decision trials, while IFJ stimulation
slowed decision responses across both risky and ambiguous
decision trials. These results provide the first causal evidence
differentiating parietal and frontal contributions to risky decision
making, and highlight the IPS as a key region supporting the
expression of risk-tolerant choices.
In this study, disrupting IPS activity reduced risk-taking—
lowering risk at a cost to expected earnings—for decisions
with high but known risks and uncertain outcomes. These
results demonstrate a causal role for the IPS in risky decision
making that is in line with correlative evidence from previous
neuroimaging studies. These fMRI studies demonstrated a
positive association between IPS activation and increased risk-
taking (Huettel et al., 2006; Bach et al., 2011), with IPS
activity preferentially tracking the subjective value of risky
(as opposed to delayed) decision options (Peters and Büchel,
2009). Our study, which estimated rTMS treatment effects on
decisions by repeating gambles within-subjects, compliments
prior methods by applying rTMS with strong experimental
controls for individual differences. The results of our stimulation
study buttress the existing evidence by providing the first causal
evidence for the necessity of IPS function for pursuing risky
decisions.
Given previous results linking IPS activation to individual
differences in risk preferences (Huettel et al., 2006), we interpret
IPS stimulation as biasing risk (but not ambiguity) preferences
toward certainty; this slows selection of risky options, speeds
selection of certain options (Figure 2B) and reduces risk-taking
behavior (Figure 2A). Our results confirm the importance of the
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TABLE 1 | Descriptive statistics for choices and response times.
rTMS Location Ambiguous 25% 50% 75% All trials
PERCENT CHOICE OF UNCERTAIN OPTION BY TRIAL TYPE
Vertex 40.8% 43.5% 53.1% 57.8% 49.5%
IPS 40.0% 43.5% 44.3% 58.1% 47.1%
IFJ 42.2% 42.6% 48.3% 55.9% 47.7%
All locations 41.0% 43.2% 48.6% 57.3% 48.1%
MEAN RESPONSE TIME AND STANDARD DEVIATION (MS) BY TRIAL TYPE
Vertex 1088 (438) 1109 (477) 1001 (321) 1049 (404) 1059 (414)
IPS 1097 (506) 1097 (532) 1040 (532) 1050 (516) 1069 (524)
IFJ 1132 (629) 1101 (553) 1032 (457) 1066 (518) 1079 (536)
All locations 1106 (531) 1102 (522) 1025 (446) 1055 (482) 1069 (494)
Descriptive statistics reflect raw, model-unadjusted effects in participants completing all study conditions. Descriptive statistics reported are distinct from inferential, model-adjusted
statistics reported in the manuscript text.
FIGURE 2 | IPS and IFJ stimulation differentially affect risky decision making. (A) Disruption of IPS using rTMS biased risky choices on 50% probability trials
toward certain options relative to matched choices in the vertex rTMS condition. Positive values indicate that switches from risky options (during vertex rTMS) to safe
options (during IPS rTMS) exceeded switches in the opposite direction. A null effect of rTMS on choice would show an effect near zero. (B) Disruption of IPS biased
response times for risky trials, speeding selection of the certain option but slowing selection of the risky option. By contrast, IFJ stimulation slowed decisions across
both risky and ambiguous trials, regardless of choice. All bars indicate means ± SE. *P < 0.05.
IPS for risky decision making, but provide only indirect evidence
for how computations within that region were disrupted. One
possibility is that parietal stimulation interfered with an IPS-
supported representation of outcome uncertainty, which is at
a maximum for the 50% trials most affected by rTMS in
our study. Evidence suggesting that the IPS directly represents
probability or outcome uncertainty is lacking, however (Tobler
et al., 2007; Smith et al., 2009). Rather, IPS appears to represent
higher-order decision quantities reflecting the integration of
probabilistic information with other reward and preference
signals (Huettel et al., 2005, 2006; Peters and Büchel, 2009).
Similarly, studies of perceptual decision making in non-human
primates indicate that this area of parietal cortex is essential
for the integration of evidence in favor of competing choices
(Shadlen and Newsome, 2001; Huk and Shadlen, 2005). This
mechanism has been extended to value-based decision making,
with electrophysiological (Kiani and Shadlen, 2009) and human
neuroimaging (Basten et al., 2010) results converging on a role for
the IPS in integrating and accumulating the net costs and benefits
required to flexibly direct choices. Consistent with this putative
mechanism, we observed that inhibition of IPS led to faster
selection of the competing certain option but slower selection of
the risky option. In such a model, direct effects of parietal rTMS
on choice would be most likely for balanced decisions featuring
little accumulation of net evidence toward either option—such
as our 50% risk trials—particularly since such dilemmas produce
weak neuronal responses vulnerable to exogenous disruption
through rTMS (Kiani and Shadlen, 2009). IPS stimulation may
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thus directly impact uncertain decision processing by disrupting
the integration of probabilistic costs and benefits required to
justify a risky choice.
The IPS is also known as a key locus within a network
supporting numerical cognition (Cohen Kadosh et al., 2007;
Piazza et al., 2007; Dehaene and Brannon, 2011). A natural
supposition, therefore, is that IPS stimulation disrupts processes
necessary for quantifying costs and benefits during risky decision
making, such as expected value computation or risk-discounted
value comparison. While our experiment was not designed to
dissociate such processes, we again note that IPS stimulation
affected risk-taking only for the 50% probability condition, and
not for the 25%, and 75% conditions. In our study, value
computations were simplest for 50% probabilities, while value
comparisons were more demanding, since the model-adjusted
baseline (i.e., vertex TMS control) percentage of risky choices
for these trials was 60%, indicating that differences in risky
and certain subjective values were small compared to the other
probability conditions (model adjusted baseline values for other
conditions were 21%, 90%, and 28% for the 25% risk, 75% risk,
and ambiguity conditions, respectively). Prior neuroeconomic
findings suggest that the often-subtle disruptions of processing
induced by rTMS are most clearly revealed in overt behavior
at such “tipping points,” where subjective preferences are close
to indifference (Figner et al., 2010). Additionally, IPS activation
has been shown to parametrically represent the closeness of
numeric magnitudes (Ansari et al., 2006). Given this pattern
of results, we speculate that rTMS may have disrupted relative
value comparison processes supported by the IPS (Dorris and
Glimcher, 2004), as opposed to altering the direct computation
of risky expected values. Decreased confidence in the relative
premium offered by the risky option could thereby reduce
willingness to accept those options.
Despite previous evidence linking IFJ activation with
ambiguity preferences (Huettel et al., 2006; Bach et al.,
2011), our RT results support a largely general role for
IFJ in decision making under uncertainty, with both risky
and ambiguous choices slowed by IFJ stimulation. Further
studies integrating executive and motor control tasks are
required to determine whether this slowing results from
interference with higher-order decision-control or lower-order
decision-implementation processes. Recent findings suggest that
although IFJ is engaged by the presence of ambiguity, its
activity does not scale with increasing degrees of ambiguity
(Bach et al., 2011; Bach and Dolan, 2012), raising questions
regarding the interpretation of previous findings featuring
categorical—rather than continuous—measures of ambiguity
(Huettel et al., 2006; Bach et al., 2009). Instead, IFJ engagement
during ambiguous choice may reflect the increased cognitive
control required to address problems featuring missing or
hidden information (Koechlin et al., 2003; Brass and von
Cramon, 2004; Bach et al., 2011; Helfinstein et al., 2014).
Ambiguous decisions may be implemented in qualitatively
different ways less reliant on numerical processing or IPS-
mediated magnitude comparison (Camerer and Weber, 1992;
Bach and Dolan, 2012), as we found no clear evidence supporting
an effect of IPS stimulation on ambiguous choices. Conclusions
regarding the specific roles of IFJ and IPS during ambiguous
decision making remain speculative, however. Variable strategic
responses and a relatively low trial-level sample size for
ambiguous gambles may have limited our power to identify
effects.
Our investigation relied on the ability of 1 Hz rTMS to
induce short-term neurophysiological changes in target brain
regions, thereby disrupting typical cognitive processing. Though
this effect permits causal investigations of neuroanatomical
hypotheses, it also imposes limitations on the interpretation
of our within-subject design study, as residual effects from
earlier stimulation sessions have the potential to carry over
to subsequent sessions. Consideration of the time course of
these effects is of particular importance for our design, since
we conducted three consecutive rTMS sessions per subject.
Previous evidence from behavioral and simultaneous PET/TMS
studies suggests that 15 min of 1 Hz rTMS should influence
behavior and alter regional cerebral blood flow for about
5–15min (Chen et al., 1997; Lewald et al., 2002; Mottaghy
et al., 2002; Eisenegger et al., 2008). In our study, we sought
to limit the carryover of behavioral influences from prior
rTMS sessions by imposing a break period between sessions.
Approximately 30 min separated task runs from previous
rTMS sessions, a period which is 2–3 times longer than
the expected time required for behavioral effects of rTMS to
dissipate.
However, while behavioral effects of our rTMS stimulation
sessions were expected to dissipate within 15 min, prior studies
have found subtle electrophysiological after-effects of 1 Hz rTMS
up to about 40 min post-stimulation, even in the absence of
behavioral effects (as reviewed by Rossi et al., 2009). Research
into the neurophysiological basis of such extended rTMS effects
is ongoing (Hamidi et al., 2009; Thut and Pascual-Leone, 2010;
Noh et al., 2012; Chung et al., 2015), and future studies should
seek to specifically characterize the electrophysiological profile
of repeated rTMS sessions. Within the design and analysis
approach of the present study, we attempted to mitigate against
these potential longer-term carryover effects via two additional
counter-measures. First, we counterbalanced the order of rTMS
sessions, such that any carryover effects should in theory be
similarly affecting the different stimulation conditions. Second,
we also included the sequence order of rTMS sessions as
a control predictor in our statistical models (Supplemental
Results, Tables S1 and S6), such that any effects of stimulation
order should in principle be accounted for in the results.
Nevertheless, given the inherent susceptibility of a within-
subjects design to carryover effects, it would be beneficial for
independent researchers to corroborate the present findings
using convergent methods, including between-subjects designs
and alternative rTMS protocols such as 5 Hz or theta-burst
stimulation (Peinemann et al., 2004; Huang et al., 2005; Zafar
et al., 2008).
Our results are the first to demonstrate the necessity of
unperturbed IPS function for risk tolerance during uncertain
decision making, and provide insight into the functions and
interactions of fronto-parietal decision circuits. Our focus on the
parietal cortex during risky decision making also complements
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prior rTMS work showing increased risk-taking and impulsivity
following disruption of prefrontal self-control processes (Knoch
et al., 2006; Figner et al., 2010). Future work could extend
our findings using between-subjects designs amenable to the
investigation of individual differences in risk preferences, as well
as by probing the extent of IPS effects by continuously varying
probability around the 50% level noted here. The present findings
suggest that engagement of IPS during decision making may
support the ability to trade certainty for a chance at greater
expected gains.
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